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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
the right to compete with other citizens for government employment is
a constitutional right, upon which government may impose only such
qualifications as are reasonably related to the employment sought.
THE ORIGINAL PACKAGE-A FACTOR, NOT A TEST
By invoking the import-export clause of the United States Constitu-
tion,' plaintiff sought to enjoin the imposition of state personal prop-
erty taxes upon unsold portions of imported shipments of greenheart
pilings and timber. The lumber was stacked in plaintiff's storage
yard, according to existing orders or length. Plaintiff contended that
each piece of greenheart, bearing identification stamped at the point
of origin of the shipment, constituted an original package and was
therefore immune from state taxation. The trial court entered judg-
ment for defendant tax officials on the ground that, when imports
are inherently incapable of being packaged, the unit of transportation
or importation constitutes the original package, which is "broken"
when offered for sale to the general public. On appeal, a majority of
the Supreme Court of Florida voted to reverse. Held: The unsold
remainder of imported lumber stacked in a storage yard according
to existing orders or length, with the pieces physically unaltered,
is immune from state personal property taxation under the import-
export clause of the United States Constitution. Florida Greenheart
Corp. v. Gautier, 172 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
825 (1965).
The original package test was first stated in 1827 by Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall in Brown v. Maryland:
While remaining the property of the importer, in his warehouse, in the
original form or package in which it was imported, a tax upon [the thing
imported] is too plainly a duty on imports, to escape the prohibition in
the constitution.2
1 "No State shall, without the consent of the congress, lay any imposts or duties on
imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspec-
tion laws ... ." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
225 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 442 (1827). The records of the Constitutional Conven-
tion indicate that one primary purpose for the absolute prohibition against state taxa-
tion of imports was the protection of the inland, non-importing states from their
importing neighbors. 2 FARRAND, THE REcORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTioN 441, 442(1911). Chief Justice farshall, in Brown, thus referred to the intent of the framers of
the Constitution:
Yet the framers of our constitution have thought this a power which no state
ought to exercise .... A duty on imports is a tax on the article which is paid by
the consumer. The great importing states would thus levy a tax on the non-import-
ing states .... 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 440.
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The original package test was never the sole criterion for determining
at what point in time, for purposes of taxation, foreign imports lose
their immunity. From the time of Brown v. Maryland to the present,
the Supreme Court has held that the immunity from state taxation
of imported goods was also lost when they were sold or put to the
use for which they were imported.3 Since 1959, imported goods have
lost their immunity upon becoming part of the "current operational
needs" of the manufacturing process for which they were imported.
4
In those cases in which the original package test is employed, there
is wide disagreement among the courts as to what constitutes an
original package, how it is "broken," and what circumstances call
for application of the test.' The principal case is but one example
of this disagreement.
The majority reasoned that, since the lumber had not been put
to the use for which it was intended, i.e. sale, the original package
test was to be applied. In the opinion of the majority, state taxes
are prohibited6 so long as the imported goods remain in their original
form or package; 7 therefore, unsold portions of imported shipments
of lumber are immune from state taxation while they remain in the
possession of the importer awaiting sale and without physical altera-
tion. The dissent, relying on a rule announced by a California District
Court of Appeals in E. J. Stanton & Sons v. Los Angeles County,8
concluded that the shipment as a whole constituted an original package
which was broken when portions were sold and the remnants were
mixed with new shipments. The dissent also indicated doubt as to
whether the purpose of importation was sale, as opposed to offering
for sale, a point made by the trial court.
An original package is generally regarded as that package or aggre-
3 Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 657 (1945).
4 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534 (1959).
5 See Trickett, The Original Package Ineptitude, 6 COLUm. L. REv. 161 (1906).
6 The court in the principal case did not consider whether personal property taxes
are included within the prohibited "imposts or duties." Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 29 (1871), rejected the argument that, because a state ad valorem property tax
represents a quid pro quo for such state services as fire and theft protection, it should
not be included under the constitutional prohibition. However, Professor T. R. Powell
has suggested that a reconsideration of whether property taxes should be regarded as
imposts or duties might be valuable. Powell, State Taxation of Imports-When Does
an Import Cease to be an Import, 58 HARV. L. REv. 858, 874-75 (1945).
7 The phrase "original form or package" was employed by Marshall without elabor-
ation. This combination formula was applied and followed in subsequent cases. Gulf
Fisheries Co. v. Maclnerney, 276 U.S. 124 (1928); Mexican Petroleum Corp. v. Louis-
iana Tax Comm'n, 173 La. 604, 138 So. 117 (1931).
8 78 Cal. App. 2d 181, 177 P.2d 804, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 766 (1947).
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gate of goods which is delivered as a unit by the foreign shipper.'
When individual packages or articles are shipped as units in larger
containers, those larger containers are usually held to be the original
package." But individual articles, or goods in small volume units,
packed in individual packages within larger containers, have been
held to constitute original packages." When packaging is inherently
impossible, as in the principal case, the holdings are widely split.
In some cases, the entire aggregate of goods shipped, 2 or even ships
together with their contents, 3 have been held to constitute the original
package. In other cases in which actual packaging is impossible,
the "original form" is emphasized, and unsold imports are held im-
mune from state taxation until they are physically altered.'4
In still other cases in which imported goods are inherently incapa-
ble of being packaged, the original package rule is considered in-
applicable and the question becomes whether the goods have been
commingled with other property in the state." Chief Justice Marshall,
in Brown v. Maryland, immediately prior to stating the original
package test, first formulated a general rule to determine when im-
ported goods cease to be imports for tax purposes:
When the importer has so acted upon the thing imported, that it has
become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the
' See E. J. Stanton & Sons v. Los Angeles County, id.; Austin v. State, 101 Tenn.
563, 48 S.W. 305 (1898), aff'd, 179 U.S. 343 (1900).
10 Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192 (1912) (a large case contain-
ing smaller boxes each of which contained a bottle filled with malt liquor was held to
constitute the original package); May v. New Orleans, 178 U.S. 496 (1900) (boxes con-
taining separate parcels of dry goods imported for resale by merchants were held to be
original packages, "broken" when opened by merchants in order to sell the separate
parcels).
"I Askren v. Continental Oil Co., 252 U.S. 444 (1920) (although tank car loads of
gasoline were the usual units of importation, barrels and packages containing two 5-
gallon cans of gasoline were held to constitute original packages); Leisy v. Hardin,
135 U.S. 100 (1890) (one-quarter and one-eighth barrels of beer and cases containing
bottles of beer were held to be original packages).
12 E.g., E. J. Stanton & Sons v. Los Angeles County, 78 Cal. App. 2d 181, 177 P.2d
804, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 766 (1947).
13 Mexican Petroleum Corp. v. South Portland, 121 Me. 128, 115 Atl. 900 (1922).
14 Gulf Fisheries Co. v. MacInerney, 276 U.S. 124 (1928) (fish which had been be-
headed, gutted, or washed and re-iced were held to have lost their character as im-
ports); Mexican Petroleum Corp. v. Louisiana Tax Comm'n, 173 La. 604, 138 So. 117
(1931) (imported crude oil which had been pumped from tankers into storage tanks on
shore was held to have retained its character as an import on the ground that it re-
mained in its original form).
15 Tres Ritos Ranch Co. v. Abbott, 44 N.M. 556, 105 P.2d 1070 (1940) (imported
cattle which were kept on importer's ranch, together with "domestic" cattle, for the
purpose of grazing, fattening and breeding them prior to resale were held taxable by
the state because they were thus commingled with the mass of property in the state).
1966]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
country, it has, perhaps, lost its distinctive character as an import,
and has become subject to the taxing power of the state .... I'
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have omitted Marshall's quali-
fying "perhaps."" It has been suggested that "so acting upon the thing
imported that it has become incorporated and mixed up with the
mass of property in the country" is not a genuine criterion, but only
a figure of speech, particularly since imported articles generally retain
indicia of their foreign make." However, in the context of Marshall's
opinion the following order of inquiry presents a logical progression:
1) When may imported goods be taxed by the states? When they
cease to be "imports." 2) When do imported goods cease to be
"imports"? When the importer has so acted upon them that they
have become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property
in the country. 3) When has the importer so acted upon them?
When he has broken the original package 9 or changed the original
form, or when he has sold the goods,2" utilized them in a manufacturing
process," or otherwise put them to the use for which they were
intended.22
The original package doctrine thus appears less as an independent
test than as an example of how an importer could so act upon im-
16 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 419, 441-42 (1827).
17 May v. New Orleans, 178 U.S. 496 (1900); Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29
(1871). "The slight hesitation in announcing this rule as indicated by the word 'per-
haps' has entirely disappeared in subsequent decisions, and the general rule there an-
nounced has often been reiterated in substantially the same essence, though in varying
form." Mexican Petroleum Corp. v. City of South Portland, 121 Me. 128, 115 Atl.
900, 901-02 (1922).
18 Trickett, The Original Package Ineptitude, 6 COLUM. L. REv. 161, 166 (1906).
See 19 U.S.C. § 1304 (1965), which provides that every article of foreign origin, or its
container, imported into the United States shall be marked so as to indicate to the
ultimate purchaser the country of origin.
'9 Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534, 549 (1959), in which
the Court classified the breaking of the original package as merely one factor in de-
termining whether goods have been put to the use for which they were intended.
20 "It is settled law in this court that merchandise in the original packages once sold
by the importer is taxable as other property." Waring v. The Mayor, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 110, 122 (1868). As authority for this rule Waring cites Pervear v. Common-
wealth, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1866). Although Pervear is often cited to this effect
and does explicitly state that the sale of merchandise while remaining in the original
packages renders the merchandise subject to state taxation, this is only dictum. "Mer-
chandise in original packages, once sold by the importer, is taxable as other property.
But in the case before us there was no importation." Id. at 479.
21 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534 (1959) (iron ore which
was stored in importer-manufacturer's storage yard was held to have lost its tax im-
munity because it was being used to supply the current manufacturing needs of the
importer).
22 Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 665 (1945) (bales of imported
hemp stored in importer's warehouse prior to their use in importer's manufacturing
process were held not subject to state taxation because they had not yet been put to
the use for which they were intended).
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ported things that they would become incorporated and mixed up
with the mass of property in the country. 3 The Supreme Court's
1959 decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers2" extended
the "use for which intended" test to strip state taxation immunity
from goods necessary for the "current operational needs" of the
importer's manufacturing process. This decision also appeared to
open the door to an application of the new "current operational needs"
test to goods held by the importer awaiting sale.2 The majority
opinion in Youngstown explicitly stated that breaking the original
package is only one of the ways by which packaged goods which have
been imported for use in manufacturing can lose their character as
imports." It is disappointing that the Supreme Court, in denying
certiorari to the principal case and others like it, has declined to
take advantage of opportunities to bring the state courts up to date.
In both the principal case and E. J. Stanton & Sons v. Los Angeles
23 "While Chief Justice Marshall did not undertake definitely to state just what acts
or conduct of the importer would be deemed to have "so acted upon the thing im-
ported" as to cause it to be "mixed up with the mass of property in the country[and to lose] its distinctive character as an import," he did specify some of the
acts that would so result. He held that the goods lose their character as imports
when the importer (1) "sells them," or (2) "[breaks] up his packages, and[travels] with them as an itinerant pedlar." ... More important to the question
confronting us, he also held (3) that goods brought into this country by an im-
porter "for his own use" and here "used" by him are to be regarded as a part of
the "common mass" of property and are not immune from state taxation.
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534, 541-42 (1959).
In May v. New Orleans, 178 U.S. 496, 508 (1900), the Supreme Court considered
the original package test within the context of the imported goods' incorporation with
the mass of property in the state:
So the question in the present case is whether the plaintiffs, prior to the assess-
ment complained of, had so acted upon the goods imported by them as to incorpor-
ate them with the mass of the property in the State, and bring them, while in their
possession, within the range of local taxation.
Thus, the breaking of the original package was merely a factor in deciding whether
the importers had so acted upon the goods that they had become incorporated with
the mass of property in the state.
"It is a matter of hornbook owledgethat the original package statement of Jus-tice Marshall was an illustration, rather than a formula, and that its application is evi-
dentiary, and not substantive...." City of Galveston v. Mexican Petroleum Corp., 15
F.2d 208 (S.D. Tex. 1926).
24 358 U.S. 534 (1959).
25 In Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945), it was stated that when
imported goods are stored in their original packages awaiting manufacture, they will
enjoy immunity for the same reason that imports prior to sale are immune. In his
dissenting opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube, Mr. Justice Frankfurter cautioned
that the current operational needs test favored by the majority might be just as well
applied to goods imported for sale. However, an attempt to do so failed in Tricon,
Inc. v. King County, 60 Wn. 2d 392, 374 P.2d 174 (1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 908(1963), in which the Washington Supreme Court held that goods which were imported
for resale and which remained in original containers did not lose their tax immunity
when they became part of the importer's current inventory of goods held for sale.
26 358 U.S. at 548 (1959).
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
County," the state courts attempted to apply the original package
test to factually similar situations in which there were, in fact, no
"packages," while apparently ignoring the broader question of whether
the importer had so acted upon the goods that they had been incorp-
orated with the mass of property in the country. This narrow
approach has resulted in conflicting decisions which fail to shed light
on the basic question: when, for purposes of state taxation, do im-
ported goods cease to be imports?
ACQUITTAL OF RECKLESS DRIVING DOES NOT BAR
PROSECUTION FOR VEHICULAR HOMICIDE
After being involved in a fatal automobile collision, defendant was
charged by information, in a court of limited jurisdiction, with the
misdemeanor of reckless driving.' Trial by a three judge panel resulted
in acquittal.' Subsequently, an indictment was returned by county
grand jury charging defendant with vehicular homicide, a felony re-
quiring proof of driving in a "reckless or culpably negligent manner,
whereby a human being is killed."' Defendant contended that the
prosecution for vehicular homicide would subject him to double jeo-
pardy. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court
granted an order prohibiting the trial, agreeing that it would necessar-
fly be a retrial of the charge of reckless driving.' On appeal, although
no more than three members of the New York Court of Appeals could
agree on a basis of decision, four of the seven judges voted for
reversal. Held: Acquittal of the misdemeanor of reckless driving, in
a court of limited jurisdiction, will not necessarily bar subsequent
prosecution in a court of greater jurisdiction for the felony of vehicu-
lar homicide, even though the latter crime requires proof that defend-
ant drove in a "reckless or culpably negligent manner." Martinis v.
27 78 Cal. App. 2d 181, 177 P.2d 804, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 766 (1947).
1 N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIc LAW § 1190, provides: "Reckless driving shall mean
driving or using any motor vehicle . . . in a manner which unreasonably interferes
with the free and proper use of the public highway, or unreasonably endangers users
of the public highway. ...
2 The acquittal of reckless driving received both local and national publicity, in part
because defendant's father was then a judge of the court in which the trial took place,
though not a member of the panel that tried him. The trial also involved conflicts in
testimony which resulted in investigations of possible perjury. See New York Times,
July 2, 1963, p. 1, col. 3; New York Times, Aug. 3, 1963, p. 1, col. 3.
3 N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1053-a provides: "A person who operates or drives any vehicle
of any kind in a reckless or culpably negligent manner, whereby a human being is
killed, is guilty of criminal negligence in the operation of a vehicle resulting in death."
4 In re Martinis, 20 App. Div. 2d 79, 244 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1963).
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